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TAX LAW

Tax Law § 697(e): Secrecy provision prohibits disclosure of income
tax return to grand jury in non-tax-related matter
Section 697(e) of the Tax Law prohibits disclosure of individual
tax return information by officers or employees of the Department
of Taxation and Finance "[e]xcept in accordance with proper judicial order or as otherwise provided by law.""24 The statute provides
for exceptions to the nondisclosure rule where the information
sought is directly involved in a tax collection proceeding 6r any
other action or proceeding arising under the personal income tax
law. 4' Interpreting similar provisions in other sections of the tax
law, 42 lower courts consistently have held judicial orders and subpoenas for tax-related information improper if issued under circumstances which do not fall within an enumerated statutory excep"IN.Y. TAX LAW § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). Section 697(e) provides in
pertinent part:
Except in accordance with proper judicial order or as otherwise provided by law, it
shall be unlawful for the tax commission . . . to divulge or make known in any
manner the amount of income or any particulars set forth or disclosed in any report
or return required under this article.
Since its enactment in 1919, the state's tax law has contained confidentiality provisions
almost identical to those set forth in § 697(e). See Ch. 627, § 384, [1919] N.Y. Laws 1656.
These confidentiality provisions were designed to encourage the taxpayer to file a complete
return without fear that his statements would be used adversely in any other connection. 1920
Op. N.Y. Arr'y GEN. 219. Violation of the secrecy provision is punishable by fine, imprisonment, dismissal from state employment and exclusion from public office for up to 5 years.
N.Y. TAX LAW § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
" Tax commission officers may not be required to reveal any information contained in
tax returns or reports,
except on behalf of the tax commission in an action or proceeding under the provisions of the tax law or in any other action or proceeding involving the collection of
a tax due under this chapter to which the state or the tax commission is a party or
a claimant, or on behalf of any party to any action or proceeding under the provisions of this article when the reports, returns or facts shown thereby are directly
involved in such action or proceeding, in any of which events the court may require
the production of, and may admit in evidence, so much of said reports, returns or
the facts shown thereby, as are pertinent to the action or proceeding and no more.
N.Y. TAX LAW § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). Subdivision (e) also does not prohibit
delivery of a copy of the income tax return to the taxpayer himself or to the attorney general
when a tax-related court action has been instituted. Id. In addition, subdivision (f)
permits
disclosure of relevant tax return information to the federal government or other state governments whose taxing authorities allow reciprocal exchange privileges. N.Y. TAx LAW § 697(f)
(McKinney 1975).
2I See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 202 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1978-1979) (corporation tax),
211(8) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (business corporation franchise tax), 437 (McKinney
1975) (alcoholic beverages tax), 514 (McKinney 1975) (highway use tax), 1146 (McKinney
1975) (sales tax), 1467 (McKinney 1975) (banking franchise tax), 1518 (McKinney 1975)
(insurance franchise tax).
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tion.241 Recently, in New York State Department of Taxation and
243 See, e.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Browne, 269 App. Div. 108, 53 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 296 N.Y. 549, 68 N.E.2d 861 (1945); People v. Isaac G. Johnson &
Co., 213 App. Div. 402, 210 N.Y.S. 92 (lst Dep't 1925); People v. Wedelstaedt, 77 Misc. 2d
918, 356 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1974); Thaler v. Murphy, 42 Misc. 2d 1, 247
N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964); In re Fowlkes' Estate, 16 Misc. 2d 1043, 185
N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1959). The phrase "except in accordance with proper
judicial order or as otherwise provided by law" uniformly has been interpreted in a restrictive
manner. Such interpretations reflect the prevailing view that "it was the intent of the Legislature to make the returns and other information supplied under the Income Tax Law
privileged communications between the taxpayer and the Comptroller, not to be used in
collateral proceedings as evidence without the consent of the taxpayer." 1920 Op.N.Y. Avr'y
GEN. 219 (emphasis in original). Thus, in the early case of People v. Isaac G. Johnson & Co.,
213 App. Div. 402, 210 N.Y.S. 92 (1st Dep't 1925), the court held that the inviolability of the
secrecy provisions precluded the release of the defendant's business corporation franchise tax
returns to the state, which sought information concerning the value of the defendant's property for a condemnation proceeding. Id. at 403, 210 N.Y.S. at 93. Construing language
identical to that contained in § 697(e), the court found that the secrecy mandate of the tax
statute could not be overcome, absent an express statutory provision to the contrary. 213 App.
Div. at 404, 210 N.Y.S. at 94. Furthermore, the court concluded that a "'proper judicial
order'" may be issued only when it is necessary to effectuate one of the statutory exceptions
to the nondisclosure rule or when the validity of the report itself is in question. Id. at 404-05,
210 N.Y.S. at 95. According to the Johnson court, permitting the release of tax return information when it is merely collateral to the main issue under investigation would "destroy the
secrecy attaching to [such information] and [would] break down the protection which the
statute gives to taxpayers in the disclosure of their most intimate business affairs to the taxing
power." Id. at 405, 210 N.Y.S. at 95. Similar reasoning was applied in Manufacturers Trust
Co. v. Browne, 269 App. Div. 108, 53 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 296 N.Y.
549, 68 N.E.2d 861 (1945), wherein the petitioner in a tax revision proceeding claimed that
the State Tax Commission had unfairly assessed a franchise tax. 269 App. Div. at 109, 53
N.Y.S.2d at 924. Seeking to establish unlawful discrimination at an administrative hearing,
the petitioner requested that the State Tax Commission be orde'ed to produce the franchise
tax returns filed by 49 corporations for the year in question. Id., 53 N.Y.S.2d at 925. The tax
commission refused on the ground that the returns were subject to the nondisclosure provisions of 99 202 and 211(8) of the Tax Law. 269 App. Div. at 109, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 925. The
court refused to issue the order, holding that '[p]roper judicial order' refers to an order
which becomes necessary or may become necessary to give effect to the exceptions contained
in the statute itself." Id. at 112, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 927. In re Fowlkes' Estate, 16 Misc. 2d 1043,
185 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1959), involved § 384 of the Tax Law, the predecessor to the present § 697. Attempting to prove negligence on the part of an administrator
in an account settlement of the deceased's tax liability, the objectant subpoenaed the tax
commission for files relating to decedent's income tax returns. 16 Misc. 2d at 1044, 185
N.Y.S.2d at 375. The surrogate court sustained the tax commission's refusal to deliver the
files, holding that the secrecy provision prohibited such disclosure. Id. at 1045, 185 N.Y.S.2d
at 376-77. In Thaler v. Murphy, 42 Misc. 2d 1, 247 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1964), a state senator brought a mandamus proceeding under article 78 of the CPLR to obtain
a court order directing the tax commission to disclose all records and reports in its possession
concerning the New York Racing Association. Although the court's dismissal of the petition
was based on a determination that such reports were not "public records," the court indicated
that "the various 'secrecy' provisions contained in the Tax Law . . . evidence a policy of
prohibiting disclosure of information as to matters in which the State Tax Commission is
charged with . . . responsibility." Id. at 3, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (citations omitted). In one
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Finance v. New York State Department of Law,"4 ' the Court of
Appeals endorsed the spirit of these decisions and held that the
nondisclosure provisions of section 697(e) prohibit compliance with
a grand jury subpoena duces tecum for the release of a tax return
24
in a nontax investigation. 1
In Department of Taxation, the State Organized Crime Task
Force (OCTF) 241 served the Tax Commission with a subpoena duces
tecum2 47 requiring production before a grand jury of an individual's
income tax return.2 48 The Department of Taxation moved to quash
the subpoena249' since there was no indication that the OCTF investirecent decision, the court considered the effect of the tax law's confidentiality requirement
in a criminal prosecution. People v. Wedelstaedt, 77 Misc. 2d 918, 356 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1974). In Wedelstaedt, the Bronx District Attorney served a subpoena
duces tecum on the Department of Taxation for the production of records relating to the
defendant's payment of the automobile sales tax. The court granted a motion to vacate the
subpoena, although a criminal case was pending against the defendant, since disclosure of
the sales tax records was prohibited by § 1146 of the Tax Law. 77 Misc. 2d at 920, 356
N.Y.S.2d at 414. Significantly, the Wedelstaedt court expressly adopted the holdings and
rationales utilized in Johnson and Manufacturers Trust. Id.
24444 N.Y.2d 575, 378 N.E.2d 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1978), aff'g 58 App. Div. 2d 298,
396 N.Y.S.2d 744 (4th Dep't), rev'g 89 Misc. 2d 275, 391 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Monroe County Ct.
1977).
24544 N.Y.2d at 578, 378 N.E.2d at 112, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
246The Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF) is a specialized investigative body created
by § 70-a of the Executive Law. Its purpose is to conduct intercounty or interstate investigations and prosecutions of organized crime activities. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 70-a(1)(a) (McKinney
1972). The OCTF was established within the office of the Attorney General in 1970, pursuant
to a legislative finding that the existing means for combating organized crime were ineffective. Ch. 1003, § 1, [1970] 2 N.Y. Laws 2648 (McKinney). While the task force concept is
highly unusual and often criticized, it was felt that "[tihe State [could not] afford to ignore
any avenue for rooting out criminal combines that seek to corrupt public office holders,
invade legitimate businesses, thrive on the sale of narcotics, loansharking, extortion and
gambling and often boast openly of immunity from the reach of the law." Memorandum of
the State Executive Department, reprinted in [1970] N.Y. Laws 3024 (McKinney).
12444 N.Y.2d at 578, 378 N.E.2d at 112, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 749. "A subpoena duces tecum
requires production of books, papers and other things." CPLR 2301 (1974). The subpoena in
Department of Taxation was issued by the deputy attorney general in charge of the OCTF
pursuant to CPL § 190.50 (2) (1971), which permits "[tihe people [to] call as a witness in
a grand jury proceeding any person believed by the district attorney to possess relevant
information or knowledge."
"144 N.Y.2d at 575, 378 N.E.2d at 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49. The powers of the grand
jury and its general function are defined in CPL §§ 190.05-.90 (1971 & Supp. 1978-1979). The
grand jury is considered an arm of the court, which "functions . ..to hear and examine
evidence concerning offenses and.

. . misconduct,

.

.

.whether criminal or otherwise." CPL

§ 190.05 (1971); see Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 260, 22 N.E.2d 360, 364 (1939); People v.
Aviles, 89 Misc. 2d 1, 8,391 N.Y.S.2d 303, 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977); People v. Pisanti,
179 Misc. 308, 309, 38 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (Kings County Ct. 1943).
249 The motion to quash was made pursuant to CPLR 2304 (1974). 44 N.Y.2d at 578, 378
N.E.2d at 112, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 749. A motion to quash generally is viewed as the proper
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gation involved a tax violation."' In denying this motion, the Monroe County Court found that the subpoena constituted a "proper
judicial order" under section 697(e).251 The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, unanimously reversed, concluding that the
subpoena was not issued pursuant to any of the enumerated statutory exceptions and therefore was not a "proper judicial order"
within the meaning of section 697(e) .252
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that both
the statutory language and the policy underlying section 697(e) bar
disclosure of tax return information to a grand jury.2 3 Judge Fuchsberg, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that the insulation of
"tax return information from scrutiny in nontax related matters"
reflects a legislative view that the protection of individual privacy25
is necessary to the effective operation of the state's tax enforcement
method for challenging the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y.
212, 218, 197 N.E. 220, 223 (1935); 2A WK&M T 2304.03. Absent a specific privilege, a
subpoena duces tecum will be enforced if the information sought is material and relevant to
the investigation. See In re Foster, 139 App. Div. 769, 774, 124 N.Y.S. 667, 675 (2d Dep't
1910); 2A WK&M 2304.13.
21144 N.Y.2d at 578 n.1, 378 N.E.2d at 112 n.1, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 749 n.1.
"1 89 Misc. 2d at 276-77, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 330-31. Emphasizing the policy considerations
favoring the grand jury's investigative mission, the court stated that the statutory privilege
must at times "yield to a Grand Jury's demand for evidence." Id. at 277, 391 N.Y.S.2d at
330 (citing People v. Doe, 35 App. Div. 2d 118, 315 N.Y.S.2d 5 (4th Dep't 1970)); People v.
Woodruff, 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1966), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236
N.E.2d 159, 288 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1968)). Furthermore, the lower court found that the reasoning
in People v. Wedelstaedt, 77 Misc. 2d 918, 356 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1974),
see note 243 supra, was not controlling, since the Wedelstaedt court relied on Manufacturers
Trust Co. v. Browne, 269 App. Div. 2d 108, 53 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam,
296 N.Y. 549, 68 N.E.2d 861 (1945), which involved a civil rather than a criminal proceeding.
89 Misc. 2d at 278, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
25258 App. Div. 2d at 300, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The fourth department followed the
holding in Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Browne, 269 App. Div. 2d 108, 53 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st
Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 296 N.Y. 549, 68 N.E.2d 861 (1945); see note 243 supra, reasoning
that, although ManufacturersTrust involved a civil proceeding, any distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings is irrelevant to the policy underlying the tax law's confidentiality
provisions. 58 App. Div. 2d at 300, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
44 N.Y.2d at 578, 378 N.E.2d at 112, 406 N.Y.S. at 749.
=' Id. at 579, 378 N.E.2d at 112-13, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50. Judge Fuchsberg stated that
"concern for individual privacy and for protection from self incriminatory demands has long
made us sensitive to the 'substantial and difficult constitutional questions [posed by obligatory reports which] touch upon intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs [and
which] can reveal much about a person's activities, associations and beliefs.'" Id. (quoting
California Bankers Ass'n v, Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted)). In Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900), the Supreme Court recognized
for the first time the need to protect individuals who are compelled by revenue laws to file
financial reports. The Boske Court held that Treasury Department regulations, prohibiting
an internal revenue collector from disclosing office records in state courts, justified a failure
to respond to a subpoena duces tecum for the federal tax reports of a liquor manufacturer.
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system.2 5 The Court noted that the existence of specific statutes
permitting the release of tax return information does not suggest a
contrary conclusion, since such deviations from the nondisclosure
rule are derived in exceptional public interests.2 -6 Moreover, the

statutory provisions requiring that state agencies assist and cooperate with the OCTF, in the Court's view, did not override the restrictions imposed by section 697(e), but rather were intended only to
mandate sharing of agency resources such as personnel.2 7 Finally,
177 U.S. at 469-70. The concept of maintaining the confidentiality of tax reports obtained
under compulsion of law was first recognized by a New York court in People v. Isaac G.
Johnson & Co., 213 App. Div. 402, 405, 210 N.Y.S. 92, 95 (1st Dep't 1925). See note 243 supra.
Nondisclosure requirements have been imposed in other areas where information is obtained
under compulsion of law. See In re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 301 N.Y. 21, 92 N.E.2d 49 (1950).
Construing a section of the New York City Sanitary Code which required the filing of a
confidential report as to the cause of death, the Bakers Mutual Court held that such reports
were privileged communications and not subject to subpoena. Id. at 22, 92 N.E.2d at 50; see
2A WK&M
2304.13. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2377(f) (McNaughton rev.
1961); Comment, The Required Report Privileges, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 283 (1962).
"5 44 N.Y.2d at 580, 378 N.E.2d at 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51. The Court indicated
that, while the tax laws ultimately must be enforced through the imposition of penalties for
tax evasion, the importance of voluntary compliance cannot be minimized. Id.; see Garner
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1976); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145
(1975). Insuring the confidentiality of tax returns is expected to encourage the individual
taxpayer to make complete and honest reports without fear of self incrimination in non-taxrelated matters. 44 N.Y.2d at 580, 378 N.E.2d at 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
15 44 N.Y.2d at 581, 378 N.E.2d at 113-14, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 751. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 49
(McKinney pam. 1972-1978), which permits officers of the social services department to
obtain information from any state agency, specifically provides that § 697(e) of the Tax Law
does not restrict access to the necessary information. Similarly, N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 663(8)
(McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), while not addressed specifically to § 697, requires the tax
commission to divulge income tax return information for comparison with the financial forms
filed by students seeking state aid. The Court noted that these exceptions to the general rule
of nondisclosure involved situations where taxpayers were seeking some form of public assistance and therefore could be deemed to have waived their right to privacy. 44 N.Y.2d at 581,
378 N.E.2d at 113-14, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 751; see Gunty v. Division of Hous., 75 Misc. 2d 128,
347 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972), affd, 41 App. Div. 2d 604, 340 N.Y.S.2d
387 (2d Dep't 1973); Strycker's Bay Apartments, Inc. v. Walsh, 67 Misc. 2d 134, 323 N.Y.S.2d
563 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971). In Gunty, tenants of a limited-income housing project were
required to sign authorizations allowing disclosure of income tax returns in order to verify
their incomes. 75 Misc. 2d at 130, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 610. This requirement was held not to
violate the tenants' right to privacy under § 384 of the Tax Law, since they had voluntarily
elected to reside in the project. 75 Misc. 2d at 130, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 611. Similarly, in Walsh,
residents of a housing cooperative subsidized by the State and the City of New York were
presumed to have waived the nondisclosure privilege of § 384 by their voluntary choice of
housing. Therefore, a city housing administrator was deemed authorized to seek verification
of their claimed income from the tax commission. 67 Misc. 2d at 137, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 56667.
'" 44 N.Y.2d at 581-82, 378 N.E.2d at 114, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 751. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 70a(3) (McKinney 1972) provides in pertinent part:
The deputy attorney general in charge of the [OCTF] may request and shall
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Judge Fuchsberg stated, the subpoena was not "a proper judicial
order" since it neither implemented an enumerated exception to the
nondisclosure rule of section 697(e) nor was issued in a case in which
the tax return itself was in issue. 25s The Court did intimate, however,
that a grand jury subpoena might constitute a "proper order" under
extraordinary circumstances that "plumb the very depths of judicial and Grand Jury power.' 211
The Department of Taxation Court's narrow interpretation of
the enumerated exceptions to section 697(e)'s broad nondisclosure
260
rule is in accord with both its legislative history and prior case law.
When the Tax Law was enacted, the legislature clearly intended
that the information provided in a tax return would be a privileged
receive from. . . the state department of taxationand finance,. . . and from every
department, division, board, bureau, commission or other agency of the state, .
cooperationand assistancein the performance of his duties.
Id. (emphasis added); see Memorandum of the State Executive Department, reprintedin
[1970] N.Y. Laws 3024 (McKinney). The broad "cooperation and assistance" mandate in §
70-a(3) also is found in the language of the enabling statutes of other state agencies. See, e.g.,
N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 3-0301(2)(d)(1) (McKinney 1973); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw §

210(4), (6) (McKinney 1970).
44 N.Y.2d at 582, 378 N.E.2d at 114, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52; see Manufacturers Trust
Co. v. Browne, 269 App. Div. 108, 53 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 296 N.Y.
549, 68 N.E.2d 861 (1945); People v. Isaac G. Johnson & Co., 213 App. Div. 402, 210 N.Y.S.
92 (1st Dep't 1925); People v. Wedelstaedt, 77 Misc. 2d 918, 356 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1974). Construing similar secrecy provisions in New York's tax law, however, some
federal courts have considered subpoenas for tax records within the "proper judicial order"
exception. See, e.g., United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); In re New York
State Sales Tax Records, 382 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). In In re New York State Sales
Tax Records, the district court denied a motion to quash a federal grand jury subpoena and
held it to be a "proper judicial order" within the ambit of § 1146 of the Tax Law, which is
identical to § 697(e). 382 F.2d at 1206. The Sales Tax holding, however, is distinguishable
from the holding in Department of Taxation, since the Sales Tax court relied heavily upon
the supremacy clause of the Constitution in concluding that New York's nondisclosure provisions could not insulate state tax returns from federal subpoena powers. See 58 App. Div. 2d
at 300, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 745. In King, the United States attorney issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the Department of Finance of the City of New York for certain city income tax
returns of the defendant, who had been indicted for federal tax evasion. 73 F.R.D. at 104.
The city moved to quash on the ground that such information was protected by the tax
nondisclosure provision of the city code. Id. The King court denied the motion to quash and
held that local rules of privilege must yield to federal rules where important federal interests
are at stake. Id. at 109. The King reasoning, however, is also distinguishable from the reasoning in Departmentof Taxation, since the provision construed in King was designed to encourage reciprocity of disclosure, while the purpose of § 697(e) was to insure the privacy of the
individual taxpayer.
21 44 N.Y.2d at 582, 378 N.E.2d at 114, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 751. Although the Court did
not enumerate the possible "extraordinary circumstances" which would allow grand jury
access to privileged tax information, it indicated that "great public urgency" as well as the
lack of other means to obtain the information would be required. Id.
m See notes 240 & 243 supra.
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communication between the taxpayer and the taxing authorities."'
That such information was not meant to be made available in investigations not related to the tax laws is reinforced by the statutory
language, which provides only for a limited class of exceptions to the
mandate of secrecy. 6 2 Although earlier decisions which confined the
exceptions to the nondisclosure rule to those enumerated in the
statute involved civil proceedings, 23 there would appear to be no
justification for relaxing the rule when the information is sought in
a criminal investigation. The grand jury's broad power to carry out
its investigative function2 64 traditionally has been limited by the
necessity of establishing that subpoenaed material "bear a reasonable relation to the subject matter under investigation and the public
purpose to be served. ' 285 The Department of Taxation holding simply places additional restrictions on the grand jury's authority when
26
the subpoenaed material consists of tax return information.
John F. Farmer
2'1See 1920 Op. N.Y. ATr'Y GEN. 219.
282See note 241 supra. It is interesting to note that a recent amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code provides for "[d]isclosure [of income tax returns] to Federal officers or
employees for administration of Federal laws not relating to tax administration." I.R.C. §
6103(i) (as amended 1976). Subdivision (1) of § 6103(i) authorizes a district court judge to
grant an ex parte order making available to federal officers, involved in a nontax criminal
proceeding or investigation, the necessary information to further the investigation. I.R.C. §
6103(i)(1)(A). Recently, it was held that while the statute does not expressly provide for in
camera inspection, such a procedure may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
statute and to determine the probative value of the information. United States v. Praetorius,
451 F. Supp. 371 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). It is suggested that where "extraordinary circumstances"
exist, as posited by Judge Fuchsberg in Departmentof Taxation, similar in camera inspections should be considered before any confidential information is released to the grand jury.
"
See note 243 supra.
See People v. Stern, 3 N.Y.2d 658, 148 N.E.2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958); Manning
2
v. Valenti, 272 App. Div. 358, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d
3 (1947).
2 Myerson v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage, 33 N.Y.2d 250, 256, 306 N.E.2d 804, 808,
351 N.Y.S.2d 687, 693 (1973); accord, Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 197 N.E. 220 (1935).
Although a grand jury's power is broad, it is not unlimited. Heisler v. Hynes, 42 N.Y.2d 250,
366 N.E.2d 817, 397 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1977); cf. Sussman v. State Organized Crime Task Force,
39 N.Y.2d 227, 347 N.E.2d 638, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 276 (1976) (office subpoenas issued under §
70-a(4) of Executive Law authorized only upon showing that investigation involves multicounty organized crime activities). In addition to being constrained by specific nondisclosure
statutes, law enforcement agencies investigating organized crime are constrained by various
constitutional and statutory safeguards which affect the information gathering process. See
generally PACE & STYLES, ORGANIZED CRIME: CONCEPT AND CONTROL 67 (1975); see also

NATIONAL ADvIsoRY COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT OF THE

TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME (1976).
20 See 44 N.Y.2d at 581, 378 N.E.2d at 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 752. The Department of
Taxation Court stated that "the procedural and evidentiary rules laid down by the Criminal
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Court of Appeals clarifies definition of "the same cause of action"
for purposes of claim preclusion
Claim preclusion, an aspect of res judicata,17 forecloses relitigation of matters which have been or which could have been litigated
in a prior adjudication when a subsequent suit is based on the same
cause of action. 21 What constitutes the same cause of action for
claim preclusion purposes, however, is not always clear. 219 Recently,
Procedure Law and other statues [do not sanction] a general remission of the Tax Law's call
for secrecy merely to accomodate a grand jury subpoena. . . where there is a total absence
of any showing . ..that the investigation bears some relationship to tax matters." Id.
(citation omitted).
m The term res judicata often is used broadly to include all instances in which a party
is precluded from relitigating matters involved in prior adjudications. D. SIEGEL, NEw YORK
PRACTICE § 442 (1978); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note ch.
3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). Used in this manner, the concept encompasses both "claim
preclusion" and "issue preclusion." See SIEGEL, supra, §§ 442-443, 450.
Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of an entire cause of action if a final and binding
judgment previously has been rendered on the same matter. This doctrine is comprised of
two subcategories: merger and bar.'Under the merger rule, when judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, "his cause of action 'merges' in the judgment" and may not be relitigated. Conversely, if the defendant has judgment in an action, the plaintiff thereafter is
'barred' from relitigating the same cause of action. SIEGEL, supra, § 450; accord,RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 45, 47-48, 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). For a discussion of special
circumstances, such as "dismissal for lack of jurisdiction," when merger and bar will not
operate to preclude a subsequent suit on the same cause of action, see id. §§ 48.1, 61.2.
In contrast, issue preclusion operates to foreclose relitigation of specific questions of fact
or law that were actually or implicitly resolved in an earlier adjudication. Statter v. Statter,
2 N.Y.2d 668, 672-73, 143 N.E.2d 10, 12, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16-17 (1957); Schuylkill Fuel Corp.
v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929); SIEGEL, supra, §§
457, 460. This doctrine may not be raised, however, against a party who did not have a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior action. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24
N.Y.2d 65, 71, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Like claim preclusion, issue preclusion has two
aspects. One aspect, collateral estoppel, precludes relitigation in subsequent suits of issues
that previously were determined in a suit based on a different cause of action. SIEGEL, supra,
§ 457; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977); see
In re American Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2, 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 n.2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36,
39 n.2 (1977); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E.
456, 457 (1929). Direct estoppel, on the other hand, precludes relitigation of issues determined
in a proceeding which was dismissed on grounds other than the merits. SIEGEL, supra, § 443.
For an excellent discussion of the distinctions between issue preclusion and claim preclusion,
see Rosenberg, CollateralEstoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 165 (1969).
I's
Rosenberg, supra note 267, at 166-67; SIEGEL, supra note 267, § 442, at 585, § 445 at
591-92; see Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v.
Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-07, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929).
21 See Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66, 70, 111 N.E.2d 209, 211 (1953); F. JAMES, CviL
PROCEDURE § 11.10 at 554 (1965); A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION V-43 (1969); Rosenberg,
supra note 267, at 168. According to one commentator:

